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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1983 the United States Supreme Court decided in Connick v.
Myers' that an assistant district attorney, Sheila Myers, could be fired
for having circulated a questionnaire among her fellow workers con-
cerning office policies and morale. The Court rejected the argument
that the firing violated the free speech rights that Myers claimed she
had been exercising through the questionnaire. The Court character-
ized all of the questions in the questionnaire, except one, as merely
part of an ongoing dispute over a proposed job transfer for Myers. As
a result, these questions did not constitute speech on matters of "pub-
lic concern" and did not merit constitutional protection in the context
1. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
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of an employment discharge or disciplinary action.2
One question, asking the assistant district attorneys whether they
felt pressured to work in political campaigns, was held to involve a
topic of public concern. But this question did not save Myers because
balanced against the employer's interest in the efficient operation of
his office, the employer's interest prevailed.3
Many, including a four-vote minority on the Court, viewed the
Connick decision with alarm. Justice Brennan, writing for the minor-
ity, said that "the Court impermissibly narrows the class of subjects on
which public employees may speak without fear of retaliatory dismis-
sal"4 and "[t]he Court's decision... inevitably will deter public em-
ployees from making critical statements about the manner in which
government agencies are operated for fear that doing so will provoke
their dismissal."5 Commentators also felt that public employees' free
speech rights would be restricted because of the likelihood that the
topics of their speech would be held to be of private rather than public
concern, and thus not protected.6
Particularly worrisome was the Court's statement that the "con-
tent, form, and context" of the speech must be considered in deciding
whether it involved a subject of public concern.7 It was feared that the
"content, form, and context" test would be used by the lower courts to
hold that speech on topics of seemingly public interest was not pro-
tected because it arose in the context of an employment dispute.8
Speech by the employee about actual employment conditions had lit-
tle chance of ever being regarded as being of public concern.9
In light of these dire predictions, the decision of a panel of the
Eighth Circuit in Cox v. Dardanelle Public School DistrictO comes as a
surprise. Nancy Cox, an Arkansas public school teacher, had dis-
agreed with her principal over questions of educational policy and ad-
ministrative regulation and, as a result of this disagreement, had not
2. Id at 146-49. However, the speech "would be entitled to the same protection in a
libel action accorded an identical statement made by a man on the street." Id at
147.
3. Id, at 149-53. The Court first stated the requirement for a balancing test between
the public employee's free speech interests and the public employer's interest in
organizational efficiency in Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
4. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 158 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
5. Id at 170 (Brennan J., dissenting).
6. E.g., Hooker, Balancing Free Expression and Government Interests: Connick v.
Myers, 15 WEST'S EDUC. L. REP. 633, 639 (1984); Note, Connick v. Myers: Narrow-
ing the Free Speech Right of Public Employees, 33 CATH. U.L. REV. 429,430 (1984).
7. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983).
8. Note, Public Employees' Free Speech Rights: Connick v. Myers Upsets the Deli-
cate Pickering Balance, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 173, 183 (1985).
9. Comment, Free Speech for Public Employees: The Supreme Court Strikes a New
Balance, 31 WEST'S EDUC. L. REP. 7, 22 (1986).
10. 790 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1986).
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been rehired. The court held that at least part of the speech in both
areas touched on matters of public concern. Also, even though disrup-
tion had followed the disagreement, the court still felt that the bal-
ance of competing interest was in Cox's favor.
The Cox decision does not seem to bear out the graver concerns
about the results that could flow from Connick. A number of obvious
questions arise. How did the Eighth Circuit arrive at its decision in
Cox? Is Cox compatible with Connick? How does the Eighth Circuit
position compare with that of other courts?
The view of this note is that Cox is the natural outgrowth of pre-
ceding Eighth Circuit decisions. Also, the Eighth Circuit position,
stated in Cox and other decisions, is compatible with Connick and is a
better reading of Connick than the position of other courts, that are
more hostile to public employees' free speech rights.
Many, if not most of the cases cited, involve public school teachers.
However, the discussion is meant to deal with public employees in
general and not solely teachers. The Eighth Circuit in Cox treated the
rights involved as being those of public employees"3 rather than just of
teachers. Connick, which did not involve a teacher, was cited as con-
trolling authority by the Cox court.1 2 Similarly, Justice White, in writ-
ing the Connick opinion described it as being one of the progeny of
earlier decisions which had involved public school teachers.13
Questions of academic freedom will not be addressed here. Also,
the cases do not involve speech about subjects other than the em-
ployee's own agency.14 Finally, the free speech rights of public safety
workers (police and fire fighters) are not considered because the gov-
ernment is sometimes felt to have special interests as to those
employees.' 5
II. THE FACTS OF COX
Nancy Cox, the plaintiff, was a probationary (untenured) teacher,
employed by the Dardanelle Public School District beginning in 1977,
11. Id. at 672.
12. Id.
13. E.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145-46 (1983) (citing inter alia Givhan v.
Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979); Mount Healthy School
Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391
U.S. 563 (1968)).
14. One case, Raposa v. Meade School Dist., 790 F.2d 1349 (8th Cir. 1986), involved a
subject outside the employee's agency but arose due to speech mandated by law as
within the employee's status as a public school teacher. See infra notes 109-16
and accompanying text.
15. E.g., Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976) (upholding police department hair
regulations); Hughes v. Whitmer, 714 F.2d 1407, 1419 (8th Cir. 1983), cert denied,
465 U.S. 1023 (1984) (state patrol's interest in regulating speech of troopers is
greater than that of other agencies in regulating speech of their employees).
1987]
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at the district's middle school in Dardanelle, Arkansas. The principal
of the middle school, during the first two years of Cox's employment,
"evaluated [Cox] as having performed her duties very competently...
and was of the opinion that she would be an outstanding teacher with
further experience." 16 Accordingly, the district gave Cox a teaching
contract for a third year, the 1979-80 school term.
Difficulties arose during this third year. A new principal was hired
for the middle school at the beginning of the term. He implemented
several changes affecting the teachers in the performance of their du-
ties. Cox and a majority of the rest of the teachers in her building
disagreed with some of these changes. On numerous occasions, Cox
"spoke out concerning the administration of the educational process at
the Dardanelle Middle School, oftentimes in disagreement with"17 the
principal. Specific topics of disagreement included the questions of
the ability grouping of students within the school, the effect of the
principal's administrative routine on teacher morale and initiative,
and his regulations in such areas as teacher sign in and sign out and
the use of school phones.18
Then, on November 6, 1979, Cox and a number of other teachers
filed a grievance with the principal regarding their complaints about
the administration of the educational process in the middle school.
The principal told them that before he would address their com-
plaints, they would have to file individual grievances. Cox and two
others did so. All three received job-related sanctions and were the
only teachers to be so disciplined during that school term.19
Later in the school year, the district superintendent of schools in-
formed Cox that he was recommending that the board of education
not renew her contract for another year. Following this, the president
of the board, in a letter to Cox, stated eleven reasons for the superin-
tendent's recommendation. The board held a hearing in April, 1980, at
which Cox and both the principal and the superintendent presented
evidence. At the end of the hearing, one of the reasons for the super-
intendent's recommendation was withdrawn. The board voted on the
remaining ten reasons. The board found that four of the reasons were
false, four were true but did not justify dismissal, and two justified
dismissal. The two reasons found to justify dismissal were one, that
Cox had on five occasions signed in for another teacher and two, that
Cox had once allowed her class to be interrupted by a visitor without
16. Cox v. Dardanelle Pub. School Dist., No. LR-C-80-441, slip op. at 2 (E.D. Ark.
Apr. 23, 1984).
17. Id
18. Cox v. Dardanelle Pub. School Dist., 790 F.2d 668, 673 & n.6 (1986).
19. Cox v. Dardanelle Pub. School Dist., No. LR-C-80-441, slip op. at 2 (E.D. Ark.
Apr. 23, 1984). "Richard Johnson was terminated in February, 1980, [Cox] was
dismissed at the conclusion of the 1979-80 school term, and Maxine Kemp was
placed on a probationary status for the 1980-81 school term." Id
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the principal's permission. Cox's dispute with the principal was not
given as a reason for her dismissal.20 The board members supposedly
were not even aware of the grievance that Cox had filed and the con-
tinuing dispute between her and the principal.21
Cox then instituted an action in United States District Court
against the Dardanelle District and the district superintendent con-
tending that they had violated her rights under the United States Con-
stitution and the laws of Arkansas. The district court decided that the
reasons given for her dismissal were pretextual and that the actual
reason for the board's action was her continuing disagreement with
the principal. Further, the disagreement was based on Cox's constitu-
tionally protected free speech, and the school district had not shown
that it would have discharged Cox but for the protected speech. Thus,
the court ordered Cox reinstated and awarded her back pay, $5,000 in
damages for damage to her professional reputation, and attorneys'
fees.22 The appeal by the defendants to the Eighth Circuit followed.
HI. ANALYSIS
A. What is Speech on Matters of Public Concern and How Can You
Recognize It?
The first question the court of appeals had to answer was whether
or not Cox's speech, which she alleged was the cause of her dismissal,
addressed matters of "public concern" and thus had potential constitu-
tional protection in the context of a personnel action.23 Justice White,
in Connick, stated that the answer to this question was to "be deter-
mined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as re-
vealed by the whole record."24 The Eighth Circuit panel noted this
scheme of analysis and expanded upon it.
The focus is on the role the employee has assumed in advancing the particular
expressions: that of a concerned public citizen, informing the public that the
state institution is not properly discharging its duties, or engaged in some way
in misfeasance, malfeasance or nonfeasance; or merely as an employee, con-
cerned only with internal policies or practices which are of relevance only to
20. I& at 3-4.
21. Cox v. Dardanelle Pub. School Dist., 790 F.2d 668, 676 (8th Cir. 1986).
22. Cox v. Dardanelle Pub. School Dist., LR-C-80-441, slip op. at 5 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 23,
1984). The court also found that defendants had violated ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-
1264.6 and 80-1264.7 (Supp. 1980) which concern teacher personnel management.
Cox v. Dardanelle Pub. School Dist., LR-C-80-441, slip op. at 3 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 23,
1984). This finding was not discussed by the court of appeals. Cox v. Dardanelle
Pub. School Dist., 790 F.2d 668, 670 n.2 (8th Cir. 1986).
23. I& at 672. The Court in Connick also addressed this issue first. "[I]f Myers' ques-
tionnaire cannot be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of pub-
lic concern, it is unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reasons for her discharge."
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
24. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983).
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the employees of that institution.
2 5
How the court then evaluated Cox's speech suggests that Connick can
be interpreted in a way that is not as inimical to the free speech rights
of public employees as many have feared.
1. Educational Policy
The first portion of Cox's speech that the court examined was her
objection "to the District's decision to abandon ability grouping of stu-
dents."26 However, even though it had just repeated the Connick
mandate that the analysis of speech was to consider content, form, and
context, the court stated that "[t]he educational theories and practices
employed by school administrators is clearly a question of public con-
cern."27 This statement was presumably based on content as there
was no mention of the form of the speech or the context in which the
disagreement over ability grouping arose.
The court, however, followed an authoritative example when it la-
beled the subject of Cox's speech as being of public concern solely on
the basis of its content. In the Connick decision itself, Justice White
described the question in Myers' questionnaire regarding assistant dis-
trict attorneys being pressured to work in political campaigns as being
inherently of public concern, without making reference to content or
context.28 Much like the Eighth Circuit did in Cox, the Court in Con-
nick did not discuss the extent of subject areas which are inherently of
public concern and thus do not need to be subjected to the content,
form, and context analysis.
It is also significant, particularly compared to what some other
courts have done,2 9 that the Cox court decided that student ability
grouping, a matter of internal substantive policy, was nevertheless,
based on its content, a matter of public concern. Previous Eighth Cir-
cuit decisions had indicated that such could be the case, although those
decisions were primarily in instances where employee dismissal was
eventually upheld for other reasons.
A leading pre-Connick case, demonstrating the Eighth Circuit's
view that a public employee's speech on internal substantive policy
might merit protection, involved the dismissal by the United States
Army Corps of Engineers of an applications review specialist for alleg-
edly poor job performance. The employee claimed that his dismissal
was actually due to his expression of disagreement over policy in ad-
25. Cox v. Dardanelle Pub. School Dist., 790 F.2d 668, 672 (8th Cir. 1986).
26. 1I at 673. The characterization of the speech was subject to review by the court
of appeals because "[t]he inquiry into the protected status of speech is one of law,
not fact." Id at 672 n.4 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.7 (1983)).
27. Cox v. Dardanelle Pub. School Dist., 790 F.2d 668, 673 (8th Cir. 1986).
28. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983).
29. See cases cited infra notes 35-40.
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ministering environmental programs. The district court had granted
summary judgement in favor of the government.3 0
In reversing the summary judgement, the Eighth Circuit stated
that "Nathanson's right to express the views in question was constitu-
tionally protected... ,"31 Specifically, it was recognized that a public
employee's duties could entail the use of protected speech. "Nathan-
son's duties involved the application of environmental protection laws
and.., a necessary aspect of those duties would involve the expression
of his opinion with respect to application of those laws."32
Similar language, specifically involving the right of a teacher to
speak on in-school affairs, was contained in Derrickson v. Board of
Education,33 another pre-Connick decision. The Eighth Circuit re-
versed the lower court's decision in an action arising out of the dismis-
sal of Derrickson, a public school teacher, and remanded for
consideration of the free speech issues. The Eighth Circuit decided
that "Derrickson had a constitutional right, under the first and four-
teenth amendments, to privately express to his superiors, in a reason-
able manner, his criticism of the educational or disciplinary policies at
[his school]."34
Thus, the holding in Cox, that speech on a matter of internal pro-
gram policy was of public concern, is consistent with previous Eighth
Circuit decisions. However, it is in marked contrast to rulings by some
other courts that have treated similar matters as not even tending to
be of public concern.
An example of this narrower view came in Ballard v. Blount,35 in
which an assistant college English professor alleged that he had re-
ceived less than average salary increases because he had exercised his
free speech rights. Among other things, he had objected to a "pro-
posed freshman English syllabus which restricted a teacher's latitude
in conducting the class."3 6 The court formulated the professor's claim
as being that his "speech was related to a matter of public concern,
since the decision regarding the syllabus would have an eventual, de-
30. Nathanson v. United States, 630 F.2d 1260, 1261-63 (8th Cir. 1980).
31. Id. at 1263.
32. Id. at 1264. Nathanson's dismissal was eventually upheld on the ground that it
was due to his job performance and his refusal to follow directions rather than
due to the expression of his views. Nathanson v. United States, 702 F.2d 162 (8th
Cir. 1983).
33. 703 F.2d 309 (8th Cir. 1983).
34. Id. at 316. Just as was Nathanson's dismissal, Derrickson's dismissal was eventu-
ally upheld when it reached the Eighth Circuit a second time. In this case, "the
disruptive manner and frequency of Derrickson's internal criticisms" affected his
ability to do his job. Derrickson v. Board of Educ., 738 F.2d 351, 353 (8th Cir.
1984).
35. 581 F. Supp. 160 (N.D. Ga. 1983), affd mern, 734 F.2d 1480 (11th Cir. 1984), cert
denied, 469 U.S. 1086 (1984).
36. I& at 162.
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rivative effect on the freshman English students."3 7 Although the
school's decision regarding the syllabus involved the actual function-
ing of the educational process, as did the decision on ability grouping
in Cox, the judge in Ballard rejected the contention that the subject
was one of public concern. "[A]ny speech relating to the discussion of
the syllabus concerned matters of internal college affairs and did not
relate to matters of public concern."38
Similarly, when a high school teacher in Miami claimed that he
had not been given the teaching assignments that he wanted because
he had complained about the student registration system in his school,
the Eleventh Circuit decided that his speech did not involve a matter
of public concern. The teacher had expressed concern that the regis-
tration system at his school "contributed to his inability to maintain
control of students and to effectively enforce discipline."39 The court
felt that the teacher's speech did not address a matter of public con-
cern because of, rather than in spite of, his motivation. "[His] inability
to govern his students is undoubtedly a matter of interest only to
[him]."40
Other courts, however, have expressed views similar to that of the
Eighth Circuit as to what constitutes a matter of public concern. The
Seventh Circuit took an expansive view of what constitutes a matter
of public concern in the public school area in Knapp v. Whitaker.41
Knapp, a science teacher and assistant baseball coach, had had a series
of disputes with supervisors over mileage money, teaching schedules
and evaluations, and liability insurance for teachers and parents trans-
porting students to athletic events. After being told that these com-
plaints were not the proper subjects of internal grievances, he violated
district policy by directly contacting members of the school board
about these matters and about the grievance procedure as well. 42
Knapp was then transferred to another school, ostensibly due to a
reduction in the teaching force and his lack of seniority. At trial, the
jury found that the transfer had actually been due to his complaints.43
As to the nature of his speech, the court of appeals ruled that his com-
plaints about teaching assignments were personal in nature and not
protected.44 A different conclusion was reached about the other mat-
ters. "Knapp's speech to School Board members concerning the inef-
fectiveness of the grievance procedure, . . . . informed the . . .
community of possible shortcomings in the management policies of
37. Id at 164.
38. Id
39. Ferrara v. Mills, 781 F.2d 1508, 1515 (11th Cir. 1986).
40. Id at 1516.
41. 757 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1985).
42. Id. at 830-31.
43. Id at 837.
44. Id- at 840.
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the School District that could very well have a direct financial impact
upon the entire taxpaying community."
45
Similarly, the Third Circuit viewed speech by a mechanic about the
operation of the county auto repair shop where he worked as address-
ing matters of public concern under the Connick analysis.46 The court
noted that "Czurlanis did not discuss his pay, his hours, or the condi-
tions of his employment. Rather, he challenged practices of the Divi-
sion of Motor Vehicles... that he considered inefficient, wasteful, and
possibly fraudulent and, in some cases, made suggestions for cor-
recting the problems."47 And, in reasoning particularly relevant to
the question of public employees speaking about their areas of exper-
tise in matters that involved their own agency, the court rejected the
contention that the speaker's employment status would change the
classification of speech that was otherwise of public concern.
48
Thus, the courts have taken sharply differing views about what
types of subjects are of public concern when a public employee dis-
cusses his own agency. Since these decisions explicitly rely upon Con-
nick, it is necessary to consider what speech the Court in Connick held
did not address matters of public concern. This may be helpful in de-
termining whether the broader view, that speech on internal policy
can easily be on a matter of public concern, is correct as opposed to a
more restrictive view, that most such speech is not on a matter of pub-
lic concern.
The speech at issue in Connick, the questions in Myers' question-
naire, dealt with office personnel management and morale.49 Further,
45. I at 842. It should be noted that the court believed that the grievance procedure
would normally have been an internal matter. However, it was at the time a
subject of ongoing collective bargaining. "In the context of this case, the griev-
ance procedure was a legitimate matter of interest for the citizens... who, as
taxpayers, had a financial stake in the settlement reached between the teachers
and aministrators .... ." Id,
46. Czurlanis v. Albanese, 721 F.2d 98 (3rd Cir. 1983).
47. I at 104.
48. 1d Cf Nathanson v. United States, 630 F.2d 1260, 1264 (8th Cir. 1980) (see supra
text accompanying note 32).
49. The following is the text of Myers' questionnaire:
PLEASE TAKE THE FEW MINUTES IT WILL REQUIRE TO FILL
THIS OUT. YOU CAN FREELY EXPRESS YOUR OPINION WITH
ANONYMITY GUARANTEED.
1. How long have you been in the Office?
2. Were you moved as a result of the recent transfers?
3. Were the transfers as they effected [sic] you discussed with you by
any superior prior to the notice of them being posted?
4. Do you think as a matter of policy, they should have been?
5. From your experience, do you feel office procedure regarding trans-
fers has been fair?
6. Do you believe there is a rumor mill active in the office?
7. If so, how do you think it effects [sic] overall working performance of
A.D.A. personnel?
1987]
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the questionnaire format itself indicated only that one employee had a
grievance rather than stating affirmatively that personnel policies or
bad morale were hindering the functioning of the district attorney's
office.50 The questions did not deal with prosecutions, child support
collection, or any other function of the district attorney's office that
directly involved the delivery of services to the public. If the questions
had dealt with such functional matters and had still been held not to
deal with matters of public concern, then Connick would support the
view that dissension about internal policy decisions in a public agency
cannot be protected in the context of a discharge or disciplinary action.
On the other hand, the Court asserted in Connick that it was fol-
lowing earlier public employee free speech cases, 51 including Picker-
ing v. Board of Education,52 in which the Court had held that a
teacher's public criticism of the board over the issue of a tax increase
was constitutionally protected. In support of this holding the Picker-
ing Court stated:
Teachers are, as a class, the members of a community most likely to have
informed and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to the operation of the
schools should be spent. Accordingly, it is essential that they be able to speak
out freely on such questions without fear of retaliatory dismissal.
5 3
This language was adopted by implication in Connick and gives an in-
dication of what type of speech does address matters of public concern
and is thus potentially protected, while the primary focus of the dis-
cussion in Connick itself is of speech that does not address matters of
8. If so, how do you think it effects [sic] office morale?
9. Do you generally first learn of office changes and developments
through rumor?
10. Do you have confidence in and would you rely on the word of:
Bridget Bane
Fred Harper
Lindsay Larson
Joe Meyer
Dennis Waldron
11. Do you ever feel pressured to work in political campaigns on behalf
of office supported candidates?
12. Do you feel a grievance committee would be a worthwhile addition
to the office structure?
13. How would you rate office morale?
14. Please feel free to express any comments or feelings you have.
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION IN THIS SURVEY.
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 155-56 (1983).
50. Id. at 148 & n.8.
51. Id- at 142-47.
52. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
53. Id at 572. The numerous references to Pickering in Connick, a non-teacher case,
indicate that the Court considered the reasoning of Pickering as applicable to
other public employees as well. The Court has also stated that speech in private
by a public employee to her superior could also be protected. Givhan v. Western
Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
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public concern and cannot be protected in the context of a discharge or
disciplinary action.
Cox's expression of opinion about ability grouping seems to fit
within the category of speech about the "operation of the schools."
Thus Cox's expression is more a matter of public concern than a griev-
ance about internal office policy.5 4 This is a better view than to hold
that speech about the conduct of a public agency's primary duties is
only of private concern.
2. Criticism of Personnel Policies as Affecting Teacher Morale
The Cox court also treated Cox's criticism of the principal as a mat-
ter of public concern. Cox criticized the principal for dealing with
teachers in such a manner as to affect their morale and performance
and ultimately affect the students.5 5 In this area the court did appar-
ently evaluate form and context as well as content.
Cox's statements on these matters were not the comments of a single em-
ployee bearing on issues unique to that employee. Nor were her comments
concerned solely with the immediate supervisor-employee relationship be-
tween [the principal] and the faculty. They obviously touch in great measure
upon the ability of [the principal] and the faculty to 'discharge ... the public
function of education.'
56
This result would appear to be at odds with at least some of the lan-
guage in Connick.57 Certainly other courts have used content, form,
and context analysis to reach a distinctly different conclusion.
A common approach is to hold that since speech, arguably of public
concern in content, arose in the context of an employment dispute, it
is only of private concern to the employee and, therefore, is not pro-
tected. This occurred in Ferrara v. Mills,58 in which the teacher com-
plained to the principal about the assignment of coaches and physical
education instructors to teach social studies as contributing to "civic
illiteracy."59 The Eleventh Circuit refused to view Ferrara's complaint
54. At least speech on the question of ability grouping seems to be of public concern
in content, if one thinks that all public employee speech is to be examined accord-
ing to content, form, and context in order to determine if it addresses a matter of
public concern.
55. Cox v. Dardanelle Pub. School Dist., 790 F.2d 668, 673 (8th Cir. 1986).
56. Id (citations omitted).
57. "We view the questions pertaining to the confidence and trust that Myers' co-
workers possess in various supervisors, the level of office morale, and the need
for a grievance committee as mere extensions of Myers' dispute over her transfer
to another section of the criminal court." Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148
(1983). 'To presume that all matters which transpire within a government office
are of public concern would mean that virtually every remark--and certainly
every criticism directed at a public official-would plant the seed of a constitu-
tional case." Id. at 149.
58. Ferrara v. Mills, 781 F.2d 1508, 1510-11 (11th Cir. 1986). For other discussion of
Ferrara see supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
59. Ferrara v. Mills, 781 F.2d 1508, 1510 (11th Cir. 1986).
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as being a matter of public concern because it "was made in response
to his having been denied for the course assignments which he
requested."
60
A similar view had been advocated by Judge Ross of the Eighth
Circuit in his dissenting opinion in Patteson v. Johnson.61 Patteson, a
Deputy Auditor of the Nebraska Office of Public Accounts, had been
dismissed because of the answers he gave to a committee of the Ne-
braska legislature. The answers were in response to questions regard-
ing an audit that his office had conducted. A majority of the circuit
panel felt that Patteson's remarks on the audit constituted speech on a
topic of public concern and that the state's interest would have to be
balanced against Patteson's interest in commenting on the audit.
6 2
Judge Ross, however, questioned the public interest in Patteson's
remarks. He did this, in part, because the statement to the committee
arose in the context of an ongoing dispute between Patteson and John-
son, the state auditor.63 "[T]he limited first amendment interest in-
volved here does not require that Johnson tolerate action which he
reasonably believed would disrupt the office, undermine his authority,
and destroy close working relationships." 64
As opposed to Judge Ross's dissenting view in Patteson, the clear
trend of the Eighth Circuit is to take an expansive view of what consti-
tutes speech on matters of public concern. An example of the Eighth
Circuit's disinclination to remove speech from that category due to
"form and content" is Roberts v. Van Buren Public Schools.65 In an
opinion by Judge Gibson, who also wrote the Cox opinion, the court
stated that the complaint by two teachers about the funding for an
educational field trip and for classroom supplies could not be charac-
terized "as an 'internal office affair' within the contemplation of Con-
nick."66 Judge Gibson and the court showed a decided tendency to
label any speech about the conduct of the educational process itself as
addressing a matter of public concern, because under the circum-
stances in which the speech occurred, the speech would not fare well
60. Id. at 1515.
61. 721 F.2d 228, 234 (8th Cir. 1983) (Ross, J., dissenting).
62. Patteson v. Johnson, 721 F.2d 228, 231-32 (8th Cir. 1983). On remand the district
court found that the state's interests did not outweigh those of Patteson, making
the dismissal an impermissible violation of Patteson's rights. The Eighth Circuit
affirmed this ruling. Patteson v. Johnson, 787 F.2d 1245 (8th Cir. 1986), modified,
790 F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1986), cerL denied, 107 S. Ct. 109 (1986).
63. Patteson v. Johnson, 721 F.2d 228, 234-35 (8th Cir. 1983) (Ross, J., dissenting).
64. Id at 235.
65. 773 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1985).
66. Id, at 956. The court ruled that a grievance by the teachers concerning how the
school handled parental complaints about the field trip itself "went more to the
relationship between [the principal] and the teachers as supervisor and employ-
ees rather than to the discharge by [the principal] and the school of their public
function of education." Id.
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when balanced against the interests of the employer.67
Thus, the Eighth Circuit has continued to take a broad view of
what constitutes speech dealing with matters of public concern, rather
than the more restrictive approach Judge Ross advocated in Patteson.
It has declined to apply the form and context analysis and hold that
speech of public interest in content was not of "public concern." And
in Cox, the Eighth Circuit used the content, form, and context analysis
to raise seemingly Connick-type employment complaints to the status
of speech of public concern.68 Justice White specifically stated in Con-
nick that this could occur.69 Also, Cox's criticisms directly asserted
that the principal's style had affected faculty morale, while the ques-
tionnaire in Connick only intimated that its author disagreed with her
superiors.7 0
Therefore, the court's approach in Cox to the question of what is
speech of public concern appears to be well-grounded in the example
of Connick. This is an appropriate basis for evaluating the Cox ruling
because the content, form, and context framework, separated from the
facts of Connick, is subject to widely varying interpretations.
3. A Proposed Test to Classify Speech
As pointed out by Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion in Con-
nick, there appear to be "two classes of speech of public concern:
statements 'of public import' because of their content, form, and con-
text, and statements that, by virtue of their subject matter, are 'inher-
ently of public concern.' 71 In not delineating the extent of speech
that requires a content, form, and context analysis, the Eighth Circuit
cases have the same flaw as does Connick.
How does one distinguish speech by a public employee about his
agency's (employer's) organizational policy, which must pass muster
as to "form and context" as well as "content," from speech that is "in-
herently of public concern?" This question has not been explicitly an-
swered. A workable solution may be to focus on what function the
public agency was established to perform.72 If the employee speaks
67. See infra text accompanying notes 91-94.
68. One portion of Cox's speech was held not to address a matter of public concern.
Cox's criticism of the policies requiring teachers to sign in and out and
forbidding personal use of the office phones, and her criticism regarding
the timing of announcements and messages during the day all bear on
internal matters relevant only to the employees of the school, and are
not constitutionally protected.
Cox v. Dardanelle Pub. School Dist., 790 F.2d 668, 673 n.6 (8th Cir. 1986).
69. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 (1983).
70. Id. at 148-49.
71. Id at 159-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
72. This formulation, focusing on why an agency was established rather than on why
it continues to exist, is intended to meet the objections of those who would say
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about how the agency performs this function, his speech would qualify
as addressing a matter "inherently of public concern." The necessary
assumption is that if the public, through its representatives, estab-
lishes an agency to perform a certain function, then the public will be
concerned about how the agency performs that function. Thus, when
an engineer who is employed by a public electric utility tells her
superiors that a power substation cannot meet the requirements of its
planned service area, she would be speaking on a subject "inherently
of public concern." A city garbage collector who objected to collection
routes as being inefficient would also be speaking on a subject "inher-
ently of public concern."
The above analysis, focusing on the function an agency was estab-
lished to perform, would apply to speech by the employee of an
agency, which does not provide a service directly to the public but sup-
ports other public agencies.7 3 The actions of such agencies are of pub-
lic interest because their effectiveness affects the services that
agencies which directly serve the public provide.
Such a test would be consistent with the holding in Cox that speech
about the ability grouping of students was "inherently of public con-
cern,"74 although that holding was based on public interest specifically
in the educational process.75 Schools are established to educate stu-
dents. Cox, in speaking on ability grouping, was addressing the man-
ner in which students are educated. In Nathanson, the Eighth Circuit
may have been considering a standard based on the function of an
agency when it recognized the right of a public employee to speak
about the substantive aspects of his duties.76 However, because Na-
thanson was a pre-Connick decision, the need for a standard may not
have been recognized.
A test, focusing on the function the agency was established to per-
form, would follow the mandate of Connick and exclude speech by an
employee about his or her own conditions of employment from being
considered as "inherently of public concern." While all governmental
agencies employ and supervise people, that is not the purpose for
which they are established. For speech about employment conditions
to be considered as addressing a matter of public concern, it would
have to be analyzed as to content, form, and context.
Thus, a test based on agency function would be compatible with
Connick as to what it excluded from being considered "inherently of
that the first priority of any organization, particularly in the public sector, is to
ensure its own continued existence.
73. E.g., the mechanic in the county garage in Czurlanis v. Albanese, 721 F.2d 98 (3rd
Cir. 1983). See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 26-27.
75. Cox v. Dardanelle Pub. School Dist., 790 F.2d 668, 673 (8th Cir. 1986).
76. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
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public concern." More problematic may be the question of whether a
function test is compatible with Connick in terms of what the test
would bring into the category of "inherently of public concern." The
Connick opinion did not speak to the limits of this category. The
Court held that the question Myers asked about assistant district at-
torneys being pressured to work in political campaigns was "inher-
ently of public concern." 77 The Court deemed this question to be
"inherently of public concern" not only because of the potential viola-
tion of the assistant district attorneys' rights, but also because of the
effect that such pressure could have on the functioning of the district
attorney's office.78 The concern about office performance would be
compatible with a function test, but it is not known if this concern
would have been independently adequate for a finding that the ques-
tion addressed a matter "inherently of public concern." The best that
can probably be said is that Connick did not foreclose the use of a test
based on agency function.
A final virtue of the function test would be that the courts, by
adopting it, could avoid a series of cases in which they would have to
decide whether speech about each type of agencies' functions ad-
dressed a matter "inherently of public concern."
B. The Balancing Test
A public employee, challenging a dismissal or disciplinary action
based on speech, has only satisfied a first requirement when the court
classifies the speech as addressing a matter of public concern. The em-
ployer may have interests that justify action against the public em-
ployee as a result of the speech.79 The interests of the two must be
balanced against each other.
In balancing these two interests, the court in Cox primarily ex-
amined whether or not Cox's performance or effectiveness had been
impaired as a result of her speech. It concluded that they had not been
impaired.S0 The court also looked at whether disruption followed the
speech but was skeptical about whether a cause and effect relationship
existed.81 In both areas, the court followed a well established pattern
of Eighth Circuit decisions.
1. Impairment of Ability to Perform Duties
In the Eighth Circuit, once the court finds that the speech of a pub-
77. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 (1983).
78. Id.
79. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). Later, the Court stated that
this was to be a "particularized balancing." Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150
(1983).
80. Cox v. Dardanelle Pub. School Dist., 790 F.2d 668, 673-74 (8th Cir. 1986).
81. Id. at 674.
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lic employee addresses a matter of public concern, the employee will
be in a good position to prevail. The employee will prevail unless the
employer can show that the employee was insubordinate in his speech
or the speech impaired the employee's ability to perform his assigned
duties. Clearly, under certain circumstances, speech which would
otherwise be protected can impair the employee's ability to perform
assigned duties. The boundaries of what constitutes insubordination
are less certain.
The balance can shift against the employee when a reasonable
opinion expressed repeatedly and obstinately impairs working rela-
tionships with superiors and co-workers. This was the reasoning of
the Eighth Circuit in Derrickson v. Board of Education.82 Derrickson,
a St. Louis teacher, alleged that he had been dismissed due to '"is
internal criticism of the administration and faculty."8 3 However, the
court found that "the disruptive manner and frequency of Derrick-
son's internal criticisms weighed heavily against first amendment pro-
tection of those activities... even assuming that all of his criticisms
touched upon matters of public concern."8 4
Also, in some circumstances, speech, even on a subject of active
public controversy, can directly hinder the performance of a public
employee's assigned duties and amount to insubordination. This oc-
curred in Patterson v. Masem.8 5 Patterson had been Supervisor of Mi-
nority Studies in the Little Rock school system. While employed in
this position, she had been sent to one of the city's high schools to
mediate a dispute over a student play, the language and casting of
which some thought racially offensive. Her supervisor, Masem, re-
garded Patterson's job as being to work out a compromise so that the
play could be presented.86
However, Patterson agreed with those who found the play objec-
tionable and "ultimately became the spokesperson for the protestors,
who became progressively more intense in their protests."8 7 In this
role, she sent a memo to Masem recommending that the play be can-
celled and gave copies of the memo to the school principal and
others.88
This episode was one of the alleged reasons that Patterson was not
82. 738 F.2d 351 (8th Cir. 1984).
83. Derrickson v. Board of Educ., 703 F.2d 309, 316 (8th Cir. 1983). On this earlier
appeal, the court had said "Derrickson had a constitutional right, under the first
and fourteenth amendments, to privately express to his superiors, in a reasonable
manner, his criticisms of the educational or disciplinary policies at [his school]."
I&~
84. Derrickson v. Board of Educ., 738 F.2d 351, 353 (8th Cir. 1984).
85. 774 F.2d 251 (8th Cir. 1985).
86. Id. at 253.
87. Patterson v. Masem, 594 F. Supp. 386, 389 (E.D. Ark. 1984).
88. Id-
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selected when she later applied for the position of Supervisor of Eng-
lish and Social Studies.8 9 That she was not selected was then the basis
of Patterson's claim that her free speech rights had been violated.
The Eighth Circuit rejected the contention that Patterson's objec-
tions to the play were protected speech because the way in which she
voiced them directly interfered with the performance of her properly
assigned duties. The "play was selected by the school district (or by
the drama teacher, to whom such authority had been delegated); it
was Dr. Patterson's duty to respect the district's choice."90 Rather
than performing her assigned duty of encouraging a compromise, she
had become one of the public leaders of the opposition to the play.
The Eighth Circuit showed that it would uphold a discharge based
on speech that it explicitly found addressed matters of public concern
in Roberts v. Van Buren Public Schools.91 In Roberts, the speech con-
cerned subjects about which responsible authorities had already made
decisions. Although the speech passed the public concern test, it lost
when balanced against the interests of the employer. "[A] govern-
ment as an employer has a legitimate interest in achieving compliance
with decisions that, while once open to dispute and discussion, have
been made through proper channels."92 The court did not indicate
that the teachers had failed to perform assigned duties in compliance
with these decisions. However, the complaints made by the teachers
were apparently made in an intemperate manner.93
Turning to Cox itself, the court reviewed Cox's job performance
during her third year in the Dardanelle school system and found that
her criticisms of the principal had not affected her performance or her
ability to work with her fellow teachers. In fact, most of her fellow
teachers agreed with her criticisms. Nor did the defendants claim that
she had voiced her criticisms in the classroom or that she willfully
failed to follow any instructions concerning her teaching
responsibilities.94
The court did not indicate whether Cox's criticisms of the principal
on such subjects as ability grouping continued after the authorities
had made decisions on these subjects, a factor that was critical in Rob-
89. Id. at 394.
90. Patterson v. Masem, 774 F.2d 251, 257 (8th Cir. 1985). The court did not so de-
scribe it, but this could qualify as an example of what Justice Brennan said would
not be protected speech-saying "no" to a lawful order. Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138, 163 n.3 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
91. 773 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1985). See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
92. Roberts v. Van Buren Pub. Schools, 773 F.2d 949, 956 (8th Cir. 1985).
93. "[The principal] stated as to both teachers that the grievances ... had been re-
sponses to his attempts to work with them on their deficiencies and had accused
him of incompetence and dishonesty and threatened him with legal action." Id
at 953.
94. Cox v. Dardanelle Pub. School Dist., 790 F.2d 668, 674 n.8 (8th Cir. 1986).
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erts. This could mean that Cox had not criticized decisions after they
were made or that Judge Gibson and the other members of the panel
decided that job performance and compliance with instructions pro-
vided an adequate measure of whether or not she was insubordinate.
Apparently Cox's speech was restrained in tone because the court said
that no "statement by Cox can fairly be said to have disrupted her
relationship with [the principal]." 95
Of course, Cox's criticisms undoubtedly had not helped her rela-
tions with the principal, at least from his viewpoint. An argument
may exist that even if the criticisms were valid and of public concern,
their effect on the working relationship between the two justified
Cox's dismissal.96 The court foreclosed this line of reasoning by saying
that "[t]he teacher-principal relationship is not of such a personal and
intimate nature that teachers must be precluded from filing responsi-
ble grievances." 97 This statement sets clear precedent for restraining
discharge or disciplinary actions against public school teachers. It can-
not be automatically applied to situations involving other public em-
ployees because, in Connick, the Court mandated a "particularized
balancing" of the respective interests of the employee and the em-
ployer.98 If the speech "substantially involved matters of public con-
cern,"99 the balance could shift in the employee's favor. However, a
requirement for a close working relationship between supervisor and
subordinate would weigh in favor of upholding the employer's ac-
tions.100 The requirement of a close working relationship could be ar-
gued for in situations other than those between teacher and principal.
2. Disruption: But Whose Fault?
Disruption may follow and even be caused by speech of a public
employee, even though it addresses a matter of public concern. The
Eighth Circuit has required that more than a temporal relationship be
established between the speech and the disruption before such disrup-
tion can be entered in the balance against the employee. With one
notable exception,101 showing that the disruption would not have oc-
curred "but for"102 the speech in question may not be enough to justify
action against the employee.
95. Id at 674.
96. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 570 n.3 (1968).
97. Cox v. Dardanelle Pub. School Dist., 790 F.2d 668, 674 (8th Cir. 1986).
98. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983).
99. I& at 152.
100. I& at 151-52.
101. See infra notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
102. This is the author's term for a view that the Eighth Circuit judges might have
adopted but have not. This discussion can be cast in the language of proximate
cause, but the Eighth Circuit opinions have not cast the issue in those terms and
neither will the author.
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In Cox, the court acknowledged that the relationship between Cox
and her principal had been disrupted, but discounted the contention
that her complaints had caused the disruption. "The evidence indi-
cates that the primary source of the disruption in their relationship
(indeed, the cause of disruption of the relationship between a majority
of the faculty and [the principal]), was [his] implementation and en-
forcement of the personnel policies, not Cox's speech."o3
This finding was reminiscent of earlier Eighth Circuit decisions. 0 4
Those cases held that disruption caused by reaction to potentially pro-
tected speech could not enter into the balance if the reaction was un-
reasonable or sprang from impermissible motives. In one case, two
assistant junior high school football coaches reported that the head
coach had corporally punished students in violation of school policy,
and they then discussed the matter in public. Disruption followed.
"The incident drew a considerable amount of press coverage, caused
some turmoil in the community, and is blamed for dividing a previ-
ously harmonious faculty and student body."105 The disruption was so
great that even when the federal district court ruled that the assistant
coaches' speech was protected, and that no adverse action could be
taken against them, the head coach adamantly refused to work with
them further.106 Although disruption followed the assistant coaches'
speech, the court of appeals declined to view the disruption as the
fault of the assistant coaches. "[Clounsel for the appellee was not able
to adequately explain why the appellants, and not [the head] coach...,
were deemed responsible for the unrest which followed the
'licking.' "107
In another case, the Eighth Circuit said explicitly that reactions to
speech by a public employee engendered by racial prejudice could not
be entered in the balance against the employee. In Patterson, there
had apparently been negative reactions to the plaintiff's speech and
her activity in the area of civil rights. However, "Dr. Patterson's per-
ceived abrasiveness and the antagonism she allegedly induced among
the teachers cannot be legitimate factors justifying the Board's em-
ployment decision to the extent that these reactions are the result of
her peers' racism or their disagreement with her apparent activism
103. Cox v. Dardanelle Pub. School Dist., 790 F.2d 668, 674 (8th Cir. 1986).
104. Bowman v. Pulaski County Special School Dist., 723 F.2d 640 (8th Cir. 1983). See
infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text and Patterson v. Masem, 774 F.2d 251
(8th Cir. 1985). See infra text accompanying note 108.
105. Bowman v. Pulaski County Special School Dist., 723 F.2d 640, 642 (8th Cir. 1983).
106. Id at 643.
107. Id at 645. Nor was the court persuaded by the school superintendent's argument
that action against the two assistant coaches was appropriate because "'many
subversive tactics and involvements [were] unnecessarily generated and inter-
jected into [the] administrative personnel problem."' Id
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regarding desegregation and civil rights."10s
Unfortunately, the reasoning of another recent decision suggests
that action against a public employee based on speech is permissible if
the reaction to the employee's speech is extreme enough, even though
reprehensible in motivation. This is arguably the message of Raposa
v. Meade School District.1 0 9 Raposa taught the lower grades in a two
room school in South Dakota which had nineteen students during the
1982-83 school year. The principal had given her favorable formal
evaluations. Then, in April, 1983, she reported a case of suspected
child abuse, involving one of her students, to the State Department of
Social Services, as required by state law and district policy.110
A series of complaints about Raposa, generated by the parents of
the school's students, began shortly thereafter. A number of the com-
plaints specifically mentioned the child abuse report. At the May,
1983 school board meeting, a spokesman read a statement claiming
that nine of the school's twelve families did not want Raposa to return
the following year. The school superintendent and the president of
the board believed that Raposa was a good teacher and that it would
be impermissible to dismiss her for performing her legal duty. How-
ever, they felt that it would be untenable to keep Raposa in the same
school because of the parents' hostility. As a result of this, the board
voted to transfer her to another, larger school in the district.111
The Eighth Circuit, in an opinion written by Judge Ross,1 12 af-
firmed this action on two primary grounds. First, the transfer was not
a disciplinary action. Rather, it was an accommodation to a very un-
fortunate situation that the school board could not change.113 Given
the small size of the school and the fact that the transfer was to a
larger school, which would not normally be considered a punitive
measure, this reasoning is not objectionable. However, this procedure
could be abused by transfers which are rationalized as necessary be-
cause of irreconcilable personality conflicts, but which are in fact
designed to punish an employee for protected speech.
Second, the court said that the parents' reactions could be entered
in the balance against Raposa's legitimate interest in reporting the
suspected child abuse. "Under the particular facts of this case, the im-
portance of harmony and cohesion in the ... school outweighs the
teacher's interest in commenting on a matter of public concern."11 4
108. Patterson v. Masem, 774 F.2d 251, 256 (8th Cir. 1985).
109. 790 F.2d 1349 (8th Cir. 1986).
110. Id at 1350-51.
111. Id
112. Ross was also the author of the dissenting opinion in Patteson v. Johnson, 721
F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1983), in which he advocated a narrow definition of what speech
addressed matters of public concern. See supra text accompanying notes 61-66.
113. Raposa v. Meade School Dist. 790 F.2d 1349, 1353 (8th Cir. 1986).
114. Id-
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The court distinguished the case from Bowman, where the teachers
were also transferred, by saying that the transfer of Raposa was not
intended as a disciplinary measure.' 5
This distinction is not persuasive. In Bowman, the court held that
the speech in question was protected, but that if the continued animos-
ity of the head coach made it unworkable for the plaintiffs to return to
their original positions, they could be transferred with their consent to
equal or better positions." 6 This is similar to what the school board in
Raposa actually did, and the court could have upheld the transfer on
that basis. Instead, the court allowed the severity of the reaction to
the speech, even though unreasonable, to determine the protected sta-
tus of the speech. On this basis, the speech in Cox might well have
been held to be unprotected due to the severity of the principal's reac-
tion to it.
C. Would the Discharge Have Occurred Anyway?
Cox's dismissal would have been upheld if the Dardanelle district
could have shown that it would have dismissed her even without the
protected speech.- 7 As stated before, her speech was not the reason
for her dismissal, and the board of education may not even have
known of the conflict between Cox and the principal. 8 The district
court, however, found that the stated grounds were pretextual and in-
significant and that the school would have rehired Cox but for her
protected speech.119
The court of appeals affirmed this finding. The review was on a
"clearly erroneous" standard since the question was one of fact.12 0
The reasoning indicates the tendency of at least the judges on this
panel,12 ' if not the rest of the circuit, to conduct such a review.
The court thought it doubtful that the board would have dis-
charged a teacher for infractions as minor as those cited. In addition,
the court noted that the principal had prepared memos that were
placed in Cox's personnel file, which had mentioned the grievance she
had filed. Also, the fact that the district acted only against the three
teachers who had filed individual grievances supported the lower
court's finding. The court stated, "[t]here is ample evidence to sustain
115. Id
116. Bowman v. Pulaski County Special School Dist., 723 F.2d 640, 645 (8th Cir. 1983).
117. Mount Healthy School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,287 (1977); Cox v.
Dardanelle Pub. School Dist., 790 F.2d 668, 672, 675 (8th Cir. 1986).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
119. Cox v. Dardanelle Pub. School Dist., No. LR-C-80-441, slip op. at 4 (E.D. Ark.
Apr. 23, 1984).
120. Cox v. Dardanelle Pub. School Dist., 790 F.2d 668, 675 (8th Cir. 1986).
121. Circuit Judges Gibson and McMillian and Senior Circuit Judge Henley were the
judges on the panel.
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the district court's finding."122
Finally, if the board was unaware of the dispute between Cox and
the principal and the principal had not recommended dismissal, Cox
would have been rehired but for the impermissible reaction against
her protected speech.123 It is not enough that the motives of the ulti-
mate decision maker in an action against a public employee be unaf-
fected by the employee's protected free speech. The process leading to
the decision cannot be decisively affected by a desire to retaliate
against such speech.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Eighth Circuit has developed a coherent approach to cases in-
volving speech by public employees. It takes a broad view of what
speech is of public concern. The circuit seems to view speech about
what type of service the employee's agency will provide to the public
as addressing matters of public concern.
The circuit has followed the example of Connick in defining what
constitutes speech of public concern. In doing so, it has not subjected
all speech to a content, form, and context analysis. But, of course,
neither did the Court in Connick. In not subjecting all speech to a
content, form, and context analysis, the Eighth Circuit cases suffer the
same flaw as Connick. How does one identify speech that must pass
muster as to its "form and context" as well as "content" before it is
potentially protected? This question has not been explicitly answered,
but a solution may be to compare the subject of the speech to the pur-
pose for which the employee's agency was established and to hold that
the speech addresses a matter of public concern when the two match.
If the speech does address a matter of public concern, in order to
prevail, the employer has had to show that something about the
speech itself, or a reasonable reaction to it, has impaired the em-
ployee's job performance or effectiveness. In the alternative, the em-
ployer has had to show that the speech, by timing or manner, defies
the employer's legitimate authority and amounts to insubordination.
An unresolved issue is whether some speech is so meritorious that
it cannot be the basis of adverse action, no matter how much disrup-
tion results. The decisions in Bowman and Patterson suggest that
there is such speech. The Raposa decision suggests that all speech
must be balanced against the competing interests of the employer and
may be unprotected if the reaction is extreme enough.
The concerns of the critics of the Connick decision have been borne
out in the decisions of some courts. Connick has been used to narrow
the range of topics on which a public employee may speak. However,
122. Cox v. Dardanelle Pub. School Dist., 790 F.2d 668, 675 (8th Cir. 1986).
123. Id at 676.
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the Eighth Circuit decisions and this note have shown that such an
interpretation is not the only, or even the best, view of Connick.
Edward L. Dunlay, '88

